Have Young People Really Turned MAGA?

Democrats were alarmed last spring and summer when polling suggested that voters ages 18 to 29 were softening in their longtime commitment to the Democratic Party. After the November election, when exit polls indicated that Kamala Harris had won the young adult vote by only a slim margin (if that), it seemed that the ground had shifted. A post-inauguration cover story in New York magazine on young Trump supporters partying it up in Washington captured a widespread impression that this was a generational realignment: the rise of a cadre of MAGA youth.

After examining new survey data and interviewing more than 100 young adults for a book I’m writing on how politics is reshaping the college experience, I’m doubtful. Young MAGA types may feel newly energized and empowered, but empowerment is different from numerical growth. The data suggest that the swing in young adults voting for Donald Trump did not reflect a major shift in ideology. Rather, the swing seems to have resulted from moderate-to-somewhat-liberal young voters deciding to bet on Mr. Trump out of concern about the state of the economy — and from young moderates and progressives who chose to stay home because they thought Ms. Harris was either too progressive or not progressive enough. This is a point with implications for Democrats and Republicans alike.

The most striking feature of the young adult Trump swing is that it occurred even though there has been no significant recent increase in the proportion of young adults who identify as conservative. Data from the Cooperative Election Study, a national survey with more than 50,000 respondents during election years, show that between 2006 and 2023, about 23 percent of Americans ages 18 to 29 identified as either “conservative” or “very conservative” on average, a number that fluctuated only modestly year to year. The 2024 numbers, which the study’s researchers have shared with me, show no meaningful departure from this pattern. (Despite fears of the influence of a misogynistic online “manosphere,” the ratio of young men to young women who identify as conservative did not change appreciably, either.)

Likewise, the survey registered only modest changes in the political party affiliations of young adults over the past two decades. Young people have been softening in their commitment to the Democrats, but they’ve been softening in their commitment to the Republicans as well. In place of these loyalties a growing number say they are independents.

I heard this dissatisfaction with party affiliation in my interviews. A Black woman from an immigrant family who had recently graduated from a flagship public university in the South told me she’d been frustrated by the political polarization she’d witnessed at her school, where “you’re either Democrat or you’re Republican,” she said. “It’s like hippies versus veterans.”

She took pride in not being attached to a party. Recently she’d been reading through Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for Mr. Trump’s second presidency. She’d found some elements she disliked and others she liked — a nonpartisan reaction that she suggested ought to be more common. (As with most social science research, participants in my study remain anonymous.)